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Abstract
Microfinance institutions, despite the presence of competition and informational asymme-
tries, typically offer a limited variety of contracts. Assuming price competition, we propose
a simple theoretical explanation for this behavior and study its consequences in terms of
strategic interaction and borrower welfare. We model an oligopolistic market in which Mi-
crofinance Institutions design their contracts and choose how many of them to offer. We
find that when offering a menu is costly, MFIs always offer a single contract. Despite that,
there exist equilibria in which MFIs coordinate and offer screening contracts, allowing them
to extract a large fraction of the borrower welfare. We discuss the policy implications of our
model in terms of price caps, market entry and outreach measurement.
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1. Introduction
The microfinance industry is a variegated world. There are many different approaches to
lending money to the poor: some lenders are market-oriented, some are motivated by prin-
ciples of solidarity and assistance, and others try to mix the advantages of both approaches.
Yet few key ingredients of the microfinance mechanism seem to be recurrent both in practi-
tioners’ and academic discussions. One of them is the role of the interest rate; another is the
type and variety of contracts offered. We provide a simple model to discuss the importance
of these elements and the way they interact with each other.
Economic theory suggests that the best way to cope with informational asymmetries is to
offer a menu of contracts. Yet, despite operating in an environment characterized by moral
hazard and adverse selection, most Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) offer a limited number
of contract types (Rahman, 2007, Banerjee and Duflo, 2011, Dehejia et al., 2012). This
behavior is usually justified by the argument that, in order to reduce operating costs and
hire less specialized personnel, microfinance products must be as streamlined and standard-
ized as possible. Some practitioners also argue that offering different conditions to different
clients in the same area can cause confusion and discontent between clients. In some cases,
additional financial products are proposed to borrowers as a test, and are therefore offered
on limited scale. Moreover, contracts are very often related to a particular lending mecha-
nism (for instance, group versus individual lending) and the interest rate is tailored to such
mechanisms.
Undoubtedly, MFIs are now making an effort to offer a wider range of products. Some
institutions offer both individual and group lending, others design financial products that
better fit the needs of a specific business sectors. For instance, loan contracts designed for
farmers - whose revenues are strongly seasonal - have a different frequency of repayments
compared to contracts designed for petty traders. This type of differentiation is based on ex-
ante verifiable characteristics of the borrowers as, for instances, their profession. But within
a particular group of borrowers, there can still be relevant issues related to asymmetric
information.
We present a simple model in which competing MFIs can decide the type and the number
of contracts to offer. We consider a sequential framework with asymmetric information in
which two firms (Incumbent and Entrant) compete for two types of borrowers (Safe and
Risky).1 MFIs can screen borrowers using the interest rate and the loan size as strategic
variables (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). We first assume that both firms are profit maximizing.
We then consider the case in which the Incumbent is altruistic, i.e. maximizes the borrower
welfare under a non-bankruptcy constraint.
We assume that MFIs face a market characterized by adverse selection and, due to
environmental, technological and labour market features, offering a variety of contracts (a
menu) is more costly than offering a standardized one. We show that the cost of the menu
influences in a non trivial way the type and the number of contracts offered by competing
MFIs. In particular, MFIs never offer more than one contract when the cost of a menu
is positive. When the cost is low, only a zero profit equilibrium in which MFIs offer the
same contract is possible. However, when the cost is more substantial, MFIs differentiate
their contracts in order to screen borrowers. Safe borrowers are rationed (i.e. their loan size
is smaller than what they demand), whereas Risky borrowers enjoy a positive rent. Our
model propose a mechanism to explain how, in a competitive microcredit market, the large
costs faced by lenders are reflected in the interest rates. MFIs, in order to reduce costs,
coordinate in a screening strategy that mimics the behavior of a monopolist. Each of them
offers a single contract that, paired with the one offered by the competitor, makes screening
possible. This generates a perverse effect in terms of borrower welfare, since MFIs are able
to extract a large share of the borrower welfare. When the cost of the menu is low, screening
is not sustainable in equilibrium, and price competition drives the interest rate down to a
pooling, zero profit equilibrium.
It has been repeatedly argued that the demand for microcredit is relatively inelastic to
the interest rate. There is a widespread belief that poor clients are so starved for credit that
they are willing to pay almost any interest (CGAP, 1996). Evidence for this is scattered.
1The sequential structure of the game is very helpful in easing exposition, but is not essential, since all
the results are also valid in a simultaneous setting. A formal proof is available upon request.
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Porteus (2006) reports that interviews conducted with MFI managers in Bolivia, Uganda
and Bangladesh seem to confirm that clients consider the interest as less important relative
to other factors such as loan size, non-financial services and lending methodology. However,
the responsiveness to interest rates is related to a number of underlying characteristics of
the market. The low level of financial literacy of microfinance clients, for instance, or the
level of competition can play a fundamental role (Karlan and Morduch, 2010).
Yet there is evidence that interest rates have begun to matter to microborrowers. Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by MicroSave in Uganda, “clients have repeatedly cited interest
rates as one of the top determinants of their choice of the financial service provider from
whom they borrow.” (Wright and Rippey, 2003). Dehejia et al. (2012), using a quasi-
experimental setting in Bangladesh, estimate the interest elasticity and find that an increase
in price leads to substantial changes in the demand. Similar, albeit more nuanced, results
are presented by Karlan and Zinman (2008). Using randomized controlled trials in South
Africa, they find a modestly negative elasticity, but their results are based on consumer
loans that differ in some features from standard microfinance loans. Karlan et al. (2009),
using a similar methodology, find Compartamos’s clients in Mexico to be strongly sensitive
to interest rates. Besides this evidence, the increasing spread of microfinance is very likely
to induce an improvement of the borrowers’ financial literacy. As a consequence, the interest
rate should be considered more and more as a relevant decision variable in competitive envi-
ronments (Porteus, 2006). Building on these observations, our model, discusses the effects of
competition in a market in which microborrowers consider the interest rate as a key variable
to select their favorite loan.
Our simple model is also a useful tool through which approach three issues widely debated
in the literature. First, we analyze the consequences of setting a price cap. Our model shows
that, although beneficial for borrowers, price caps can have unintended consequences on
MFIs’ profitability. Second, we explore the effects of altruism on the entry of competitors.
Surprisingly, our model predicts that the presence of an altruistic MFI can foster entry
by facilitating the screening of borrowers. Last, we discuss the implications of our results
for the empirical literature using the size of the loan as a proxy for the depth of outreach
(among others, Cull et al., 2009b, Cull et al., 2007, Mersland and Øystein Strøm, 2010). We
suggest that some caution is needed when using this measure in a market characterized by
asymmetric information, since the size of the loan can be used as a screening device and
therefore does not necessarily reflect the MFIs’ mission drift.
Other papers have examined the issue of increasing competition in microcredit markets,
but very few theoretical models are available. The most notable exception is McIntosh and
Wydick (2005), who present a model in which MFIs maximize the number of borrowers
served, and cross-subsidize the non-profitable borrowers using the profits earned by serving
the profitable ones. They show that as competition increases and profits shrink poor borrow-
ers are excluded from credit. Their result is based on the assumptions that poor borrowers
are less profitable than richer ones, and that MFIs can offer a different contract for each
borrower. We will assume instead that all borrowers give ex-ante the same expected profit
(although they differ in their level of risk), and that contracts are standardized at the firm
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level. A more recent model is presented in de Quidt et al. (2012). They consider explicitly
the problem of strategic default, and relate it to the lending mechanism (group vs. indi-
vidual lending), the market structure (monopoly vs. free entry) and the behavior of lender
(for-profit or benevolent). In their setup, competition leads to an allocation similar to the
one induced by a benevolent monopolist.
Other papers take an empirical approach. McIntosh et al. (2005), using data from
Uganda, show that the entry of new MFIs does not influence the drop-out rate, but does
deteriorate the repayment performance. They also study the location decision of MFIs,
and find a tendency towards the creation of clusters of institutions. Our model provides a
possible explanation for this phenomenon. Their estimations show no evidence of changes
to the loan size, which is in contrast with our findings. But, as discussed by the authors,
this is likely due to the fact that the Ugandan microcredit market is far from being sat-
urated. Navajas et al. (2003) describe the Bolivian microcredit market and its evolution
from monopoly to duopolistic competition. They explain how the two main institutions in
the market (Bancosol and Caja Los Andes) specialized in different market niches, offering
different contracts to target different types of borrowers. This pattern seems to be common
in microcredit markets. Cull et al. (2009a) explore the effects of competition between banks
and microbanks in terms of profitability and the outreach of MFIs. They show that bank
penetration induces MFIs to offer smaller loans. Our model suggests that a very similar
mechanism is also at work when MFIs compete with each other. But in contrast to their
approach, we show that reduction of the loan size can arise also when clients differ only in
term of riskiness (and not in terms of wealth).2 Baquero et al. (2012) measure the effects of
competition on interest rates and financial performance. They find that higher concentra-
tion is associated with higher interest rates, but that nonprofit institutions seem to respond
less to the competitive pressure. Floro and Ray (1997) describe the interaction of formal
and informal lenders in the Philippines, and argue that increasing competition might not be
beneficial.
There are many studies analyzing the effect of competition between banks. The work
of Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) is the closest to our approach. They study an
oligopolistic credit market in which firms differentiate their contracts. They show that more
competition leads to more screening, but different to our approach, they assume that banks
identify the best clients through the collateral they are willing to post. Our results are similar,
but the screening mechanism we propose differs so as to better describe the microfinance
markets. Other papers study the incentives to share borrowers’ information with competitors
(Van Tassel, 2011, Bouckaert and Degryse, 2006), or the impact on relationship lending
(Petersan and Rajan, 1995).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the basic model and de-
scribe the Entrant’s reaction function. We then analyze the behavior of an Incumbent that
2One may, of course, argue that the level of riskiness is related to the level of poverty. But, if anything,
the microfinance experience shows that, when served with the right mechanism, poor people repay their
loans as much as, or more than, their wealthier counterparts.
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maximizes profits. We show how and when differentiation takes place. Building on these
results, in Section 3, we analyze the choice of the optimal menu of contracts. In Section 4
we modify the basic setup to model the behavior of an altruistic Incumbent and highlight
the role of capacity constraints. In Section 5 we discuss the policy implications of our model
in terms of price caps, market entry and outreach measurement. In Section 6 we conclude.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a microcredit market served by a single MFI (the Incumbent), and suppose
that a second one (the Entrant) is considering entering the market. There is a unit measure
of borrowers demanding a one unit loan to finance a new business. There is a fraction β of
safe borrowers characterized by a return Rs and a probability of success ps, and a fraction
1 − β of risky borrowers with return Rr and probability of success pr. The identity of the
borrowers is private information. We assume that piRi = m > 1 and that ps > pr. Hence,
Rs < Rr. This ensures that both types have the same expected return. These assumptions
imply that if MFIs were informed about the riskiness of their clients, they would be ex-
ante indifferent between serving either type of borrowers. However, since MFIs cannot
distinguish borrowers, they forgo some profits (or make losses) if they serve Risky borrowers
with a contract designed for Safe borrowers.
Contracts are defined as a pair C = (x,D), in which MFIs specify the repayment D ≥ 1,
inclusive of principal and interests, and the loan size x ∈ [0, 1].3 We denote by CI = (xI , DI)
the contract offered by the Incumbent, and by CE = (xE, DE) the contract offered by the
Entrant. The borrowers’ type is private information. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume
that even when the contract leaves the borrowers with no rent, they still prefer borrowing
to not borrowing. We assume that MFIs can offer a single contract type incurring a cost
normalized to zero. Conversely, if they opt for a menu of contract, they incur a fixed cost
k > 0.
The timing is the following: at time t = 1 the Incumbent sets her menu of contract(s).
The Entrant observes the market and the Incumbent’s strategy and at time t = 2 she decides
whether to enter the market with her own menu. At time t = 3, borrowers observe both
menus and choose their favorite.
We solve the model considering first the Entrant’s optimal reaction for any given choice
by the Incumbent, and then proceed through backward induction to specify the optimal
choice by the Incumbent.
Note that any contract found acceptable by the Safe borrowers attracts also the Risky
ones since Rs < Rr. Thus, if only one MFI were in the market, she could only decide on
whether to serve the risky or both types. When two MFIs compete, instead, there is another
possibility: an MFI can choose to serve only the Safe borrowers, since the competitor can
help to screen out one type from the other by offering an incentive compatible contract.
3Alternatively, xi could be interpreted as random rationing, i.e. as the probability of a borrower being
served.
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When comparing the contracts offered by the Incumbent and the Entrant, borrowers are
solely concerned with the monetary outcome. The demand faced by each MFI depends on
CI and CE. We define the demand function as Bi(CI , CE), with i = I, E that assigns to
each combination of contracts the mass of borrowers preferring MFI i.
For the ease of exposition, we start by describing the best strategies of both Incumbent
and Entrant under the working assumption that k is so large that no MFI is willing to offer
more than one contract. We relax this assumption in Section 3, where we characterize the
full equilibrium.
2.1. The Entrant Strategy
At time t = 2 the Entrant chooses her contract upon the observation of the Incumbent’s
choice. She has two possibilities: (i) Offer a contract that attracts only borrowers of a specific
type; (ii) Offer a contract that attract both types. The first option is only feasible if the
Incumbent sets a contract that allows screening. Let P i(CI , CE) be the function assigning to
each combination of contracts the average probability of repayment of the borrowers served
by MFI i. It takes value pr, ps or pb := βps + (1− β)pr when MFI i serves respectively the
Risky, the Safe or Both types of borrowers. The Entrant faces the following maximization
problem:
max
xE ,DE
ΠE = xEBE(CI , CE)
[
PE(CI , CE)DE − 1
]
The Entrant’s strategy set is given by the set of all possible contracts (x,D) such that
x ∈ [0, 1] and D ≥ 1. But the strategy set can be divided in three subsets, each of them
identifying a possible intention: serving the Risky, the Safe or Both borrower types. In other
words, the choice of a contract determines whether there will be direct competition (both
MFIs targeting the same pool of borrowers) or full separation (each MFI specializing in a
particular group).
MFIs can ration borrowers in order to make screening possible. By properly adjusting
the value of x, they can reduce the expected profitability of the contract designed for the
Safe borrowers. At the same time, the Risky borrowers can be given an informational rent.
In what follows, we prove the existence of equilibria in which MFIs find it profitable to design
screening contracts in order to make differentiation possible.
Screening Strategies. Since the Entrant’s contract is chosen after the observation of the
Incumbent’s choice, the Incumbent can induce the Entrant to serve a particular market niche
and engage in a screening strategy. She can do so by offering a contract that makes it optimal
for the Entrant to target only one type of borrower. The aim of this section is to check under
which conditions two competing institutions can set contracts such that borrowers reveal
their identity by self-selecting the loan they prefer. Of course, Risky borrowers generally
have an interest in ‘pretending’ they are safe. In order to avoid this, the contract designed
to serve Safe borrowers, can be made less appealing by reducing the amount lent (xs < 1). At
the same time, the contract designed for the Risky borrowers can be made more interesting
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by leaving a positive rent (the informational rent). We explain the mechanism in the next
two lemmas.
Lemma 1. If the Incumbent chooses a contract such that DI ≤ Rs and xI ≤ xˆIs(DI) ∈ (0, 1)
then the Entrant’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract CE∗ =
(
1;Rr − xIxE (Rr −DI)
)
, so
that screening takes place with the Incumbent serving the Safe borrowers and the Entrant
serving the Risky ones.
Proof. See Appendix
The value of xI < xˆIs(D
I) is defined in the Appendix. The intuition behind this result is
standard: if the Incumbent wishes to serve only the Safe borrowers, she must ration them
by setting xI ≤ xˆIs(DI). Since in this basic model each MFI offers only one contract, the
amount of rationing xI must be set according to the Entrant’s best outside option, which in
this case, is to serve both types setting DE = DI . By doing so, the Entrant can earn:
ΠBoth(D
I) := β(psD
I − 1) + (1− β)(prDI − 1)
The Entrant’s profit increases as xI decreases. So xI must be low enough to make screening
possible.
To understand why, note that the level of rationing is inversely proportional to the
informational rent: the higher the informational rent given to the Risky borrowers, the lower
the level of rationing needed to induce self-selection of the contracts. But the Entrant’s profit
from serving only the Risky borrowers is lowered by the informational rent that her customers
must be given. Thus, the more Safe borrowers are rationed, the higher the Entrant’s profit.
xˆIs(D
I) is calculated as to make the Entrant’s profit equal to her outside options.
Note that we did not make any assumption about the profit the MFIs make if they serve
their borrowers with the ‘wrong’ contract. In other words, (prRs − 1) might be negative,
implying that if the MFIs do not screen their clients, the Safe borrowers subsidize the Risky
ones. For this reason, ΠBoth can be negative when β is small. In this case the Entrant’s
outside option is nil.
The Incumbent behaves the way explained above whenever serving the Safe market niche
is her best strategy. When this is not the case, she can specialize in the Risky market niche,
inducing the Entrant to target the Safe borrowers. In order to do so, she has to grant the
Risky borrowers an adequate informational rent, allowing the Entrant to ration as little as
possible the Safe borrowers. The mechanism is detailed in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. (i) If the Incumbent offers a contract (xI , D˜Ir(x
E)) characterized by:
Rs ≤ D˜Ir(xE) := Rr −
1
xI
xE(Rr −DI) (1)
where xE ∈ [x˜s,1), then the Entrant’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract characterized by
xE = x˜s and D
E = Rs, so that screening takes place with the Incumbent serving the Risky
8
borrowers and the Entrant serving the Safe ones.
(ii) If the Incumbent offers a contract (1, DI) characterized by max{DImin, 1/pr} ≤ DI < Rs,
then the Entrant’s optimal reaction is to offer a contract characterized by xE = 1 −  and
DE = DI− , with  ∈ R+ arbitrarily small, so that screening takes place with the Incumbent
serving the Risky borrowers and the Entrant serving the Safe ones
Proof. See Appendix.
The value of x˜s is defined in the Appendix. D
I
min denotes the minimum value of D
I
making the Entrant indifferent between the screening profit and the relevant outside option,
and 1/pr is the value of D
I such that the Incumbent breaks even. The mechanism is the same
as in the previous lemma. The Entrant has, in this case, two possible outside options: serving
both types (earning ΠBoth) or undercutting the Incumbent. The ranking between them is
ambiguous: the first outside option is relevant when β is large. Note that the Incumbent
could set DI < Rs and still be willing to serve the Risky borrowers. This case, described in
point (ii), is relevant when the Incumbent is altruistic and maximizes the borrower welfare.
(see Section 4).
2.2. The Incumbent Strategy: The Profit-Maximizing case
We now have all the elements required to analyze the Incumbent’s optimal strategy.
We start by assuming that the Incumbent MFI is profit-maximizing. Despite the presence
of many socially-motivated institutions, some of the biggest and most influential MFIs do
claim to be able to earn profits, and consider this ability the result of a careful, market
oriented, management. According to a number of researchers and practitioners, commer-
cializing microfinance is the best way to serve the poorest. It is argued that this approach
provides better incentives for managers to be efficient and to attract investors (Rhyne, 1998;
Prahalad, 2004; Christen and Drake, 2002).
Let CE(CI) be the Entrant’s reaction function to the Incumbent’s strategy. The Incum-
bent faces this maximization problem:
max
xI ,DI
ΠI = xIBI(CI , CE(CI))
[
P I(CI , CE(CI))DI − 1]
The Incumbent, just like the Entrant, can choose whether to specialize in a particular market
niche (Safe or Risky borrowers) or to target both types of borrowers. In the first case, she
needs to induce the Entrant to offer an incentive compatible contract as showed in Lemmas
1 and 2. In what follows, we describe her optimal behavior for each possible case.
The Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers. If the Incumbent wants to attract only Safe bor-
rowers, she needs to offer a contract satisfying the conditions in Lemma 1, thereby inducing
the Entrant to target the Risky borrowers offering an incentive compatible contract. When
the Incumbent is profit-maximizing, the Entrant’s dominant outside option is to undercut
the Incumbent’s contract setting xE = 1 and DE = DI . Such a contract attracts all bor-
rowers and makes screening impossible. xˆIs(D
I), as defined in Lemma 1, is set to avoid the
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Entrant playing this strategy. Since xˆIs(D
I) is increasing in DI , the Incumbent sets DI as
large as possible, taking into account the constraint D ≤ Rs. This leads to DI = Rs. If the
constraint in Lemma 1 is not binding, then the Incumbent can set any xI < 1. Under these
conditions BI(CI , CE) = β, and the Incumbent’s expected profit is:
ΠIs = βxˆs(Rs)(m− 1). (2)
The Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers. If the Incumbent wants to serve the Risky bor-
rowers, she has to induce the Entrant to target the Safe ones with an incentive compatible
contract. From Lemma 2 we know that D˜Ir(·) is increasing in xI , so the Incumbent chooses
xI = 1, and DI = D˜Ir(1). This gives her the expected profit:
ΠIr = (1− β)(prD˜Ir(1)− 1) (3)
The Incumbent serves both types. In this case, the Incumbent needs to avoid the Entrant
undercutting her contract. Thus, she sets DI as low as possible, namely DI = 1/pb, with
pb := (βps + (1− β)pr), and breaks even.
In order to choose her optimal strategy, the Incumbent has then to compare equations
(2) and (3). Under our assumptions, the model has a simple equilibrium. Define β0 :=
m(Rr−Rs)
m(2Rr−Rs)−Rr) . We then have:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Characterization). Consider the model with profit-maximizing
MFIs:
(i) If β < β0, we have a separating (screening) equilibrium in which the Incumbent serves
the Safe borrowers setting CI∗ = (xˆIs(Rs);Rs) and the Entrant serves the Risky borrowers
setting CE∗ = (1;Rr − xˆIs(Rs)(Rr −Rs)). Both MFIs make positive profits.
(ii) If β > β0 or prRs > 1, then we have a pooling equilibrium in which both MFIs set
C∗ = (1, 1/pb) and make no profits.
Proof. See 7.
The mechanism driving this result can be better understood by looking at Figure 1. ΠIs
and ΠIr (the continuous and the dashed line respectively) are both piecewise functions of
β. In fact, depending on the value of β, the Entrant’s best outside option to the screening
strategy changes. The Incumbent needs to adapt her contract (and therefore profit) to the
prevailing outside option as explained in Lemmas 1 and 2. Proposition 1 shows that a
screening equilibrium is possible only when the Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers.
To understand why, imagine first that, in equilibrium, the Incumbent targets the Safe
borrowers and the Entrant the Risky ones. As β increases, the profit from serving the Safe
borrowers increases. On the other hand, also the outside option of the Entrant (serving both
types) increases since ΠBoth is increasing in β. So the level of rationing must increase. As β
grows, the second effect dominates, so that the curve ΠIs decreases (and eventually becomes
negative).
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Figure 1: Profit Maximizing Model: Incumbent’s profit as a function of β.
Consider now a situation with inverted roles. Consider first the interval [0, βˆ], where
the Entrant’s prevailing outside option is to serve the Risky borrowers, undercutting the
Incumbent. As β increases, the outside option becomes less attractive compared to the
screening strategy, and the profit of the Incumbent also diminishes. But the first effect
prevails, so the Incumbent profits are increasing and concave. In the interval [βˆ, β0], the
relevant Entrant’s outside option is to serve both types setting DE = Rs. Here, as β
increases the Entrant’s outside option increases (and so her screening profit) and, at the
same time, the Incumbent’s profit decreases. Both effects go in the same direction, causing
a sharp decrease of ΠIr, that always lies below Π
I
s.
Note that our results are robust to the introduction of a capacity constraint for MFIs.
3. The optimal number of contracts
Suppose now that k is not as prohibitively high as in the previous section, so MFIs can
consider offering a variety of contracts. MFIs trade off the cost of a menu with the extra
profit that they might earn by screening borrowers according to their type. For simplicity,
we assume that if both MFIs offer the same contract for the same type, then each MFI serves
half of the pool of clients (β/2 or (1−β)/2). Moreover, the extra cost of the menu is equally
distributed over all borrowers.4 We show that, under our assumptions, offering a menu of
contracts cannot be an equilibrium. This analysis also allows us to show formally that there
4In principle, MFIs can decide to cross-subsidize one type of borrower, charging the whole cost of the
menu on the other type. Our assumption makes the analysis simpler, without affecting the results.
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exists a k such that for any k ≥ k, the market equilibrium is exactly the one described in
Proposition 1.
Imagine first that the Incumbent offers a menu of two screening contracts, incurring the
cost k. In order to avoid being undercut, the Incumbent must set the repayments as low as
possible, namely:5
DIs =
1
ps
+
2k
xs
DIr =
1
pr
+
2k
xr
Thus, profits are equal to zero. It can be easily shown that the Incumbent can find an
xs < 1 such that screening is possible. Note that the Entrant can undercut the Incumbent
by offering one contract only, thereby saving the cost k. Define Db as the repayment such
that:
β(psDb − 1) + (1− β)(prDb − 1) = 0 ⇒ Db = 1
βps + (1− β)pr .
Then undercutting is possible if:
1
ps
+
2k
xs
>
1
βps + (1− β)pr ,
that is satisfied for k large enough. If this happens, the Incumbent goes bankrupt and the
Entrant serves the whole market. Even if this condition is not satisfied, a similar strategy
can be followed by undercutting only the contract targeting the Risky borrowers. This is
done by offering 1/pr + 2k/xr − . Also in this case the Incumbent goes bankrupt, and the
Entrant serves 1− β Risky clients, making positive profit. This strategy is always possible.
To see why, note that the repayment so that an MFI serving only the Risky borrowers breaks
even is D = 1/pr. Then, since xr = 1 at the optimum, we know that 1/pr + 2k > 1/pr.
Thus, for any k > 0, it is never optimal for the Incumbent to offer two contracts.
Suppose, instead, that the Incumbent offers only one screening contract, as described
in the previous section. Then the Entrant can react by offering two contracts: an incen-
tive compatible one as specified in the previous sections, and a second one (also incentive
compatible) that undercuts the Incumbent’s contract. For instance, if the Incumbent of-
fers a contract targeting the Safe borrowers, than the Entrant can undercut her by setting
xs = xˆs+, with  > 0 arbitrarily small. At the same time, she can offer a contract targeting
the Risky borrowers, and adapt the informational rent consequently setting DE = Dˆ(xˆs+).
By doing this, she also earns the profit of the Incumbent, that is forced out of the market.
5The conditions are easily computed by solving the following equations for Ds and Dr respectively:
xs
β
2
(psDs − 1)− 2β
2
psk = 0
xr
(1− β)
2
(prDr − 1)− 2(1− β)
2
prk = 0
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This strategy is not viable if k > ΠIs := k. In this case, in fact, by offering a menu, the
Entrant reduces her profit compared to a single screening contract. This is exactly the type
of market described in Proposition 1.
To conclude the analysis, note that, for the argument described in the previous section,
we know that if the Incumbent chooses a screening strategy, she does so by targeting the Safe
borrowers. Thus, whenever k < ΠIs the Incumbent does not set a single incentive compatible
contract to induce screening. She does better by offering one contract with D = Db.
6 Then
the Entrant’s best strategy is to offer one contract as well, setting D = Db.
7 Hence, also in
this case, in equilibrium both MFIs offers only one contract.
4. The Altruistic Incumbent (AI Model)
We now turn to consider a different behavioral assumption: we assume that the Incum-
bent MFI is altruistic. Examining such a case is relevant since microfinance was invented
for humanitarian reasons. It has been thought of as a poverty reducing tool, based on the
idea that poor people have a relevant - but unexplored - amount of entrepreneurial skills
that ought to be utilized: the poor must be helped to help themselves.
Nowadays, microfinance markets are characterized by a heterogeneous lot of institutions,
spanning from small humanitarian NGOs to big international financial institutions. An
economic theory on microfinance cannot put aside the fact that some important players in
the game are not merely profit maximizing.
In this section, we model a situation in which a socially motivated Incumbent is followed
by a profit-maximizing Entrant. Our goal is to understand how (and if) the presence of
an altruistic firm influences the Entrant’s strategy, the borrower welfare and the market
equilibrium. Our modeling strategy is based on the observation that, in several markets,
the first MFIs to enter the market are not profit-maximizing institutions. Business-oriented
MFIs tend to enter the market at a later stage (See, for instance Navajas et al., 2003,
Lu¨tzenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012).8 Of course, we do not claim this to be a regularity of
all microfinance markets. But, reassuringly, the results of this section resist also when the
model is solved simultaneously.9 Therefore, we believe our results to also be interesting in
markets where this assumption is not valid.
This setup is also interesting from a theoretical point of view, since we model a situation
of asymmetric competition between differently motivated institutions.10
6This is an equilibrium under the assumption that MFIs prefer to stay in the market at zero profit rather
than shutting down.
7Note that the same reasoning would apply in a simultaneous setup.
8We observed directly a similar dynamic in Odisha, India, where we conducted an extensive survey on Self
Help Groups. The NGO PRADAN was for a long time the only provider of microfinance. They focused on the
creation of SHGs and on linking them with commercial banks. In 2010, other MFIs entered the region (SKS
Microfinance, Asmitha Microfin Limited) offering standard micro-loans with a more commercial approach.
9A formal proof is available upon request.
10A very similar setup has been analyzed in the wider literature on mixed oligopoly, in which public and
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There are different possible ways to model altruistic behavior. We consider one interesting
instance. We consider a sophisticated form of altruism that we label Smart Altruism. This
is the behavior of an MFI that also takes into account the effect her strategy has on the
Entrant’s clients. Therefore, an altruistic MFI maximizes the utilities of all the borrowers
in the market. This behavioral assumption fits a market in which the Incumbent is an MFI
running a carefully-engineered program.11
Note that offering two contracts is always a dominated strategy for the Altruistic Incum-
bent if k > 0. If she offered two contracts, for the same reasoning in Section 3, the Entrant
could always undercut the Incumbent and drive her out of the market.
A smart altruistic MFI is concerned with the welfare of her clients and with the welfare
of the customers served by her competitor. She faces the following maximization problem:
max
DI ,xI
xIBI(CI , CE(CI))[m− P I(CI , CE(CI))DI ]+ (4)
xEBE(CI , CE(CI))[m− PE(CE(CI), CI)DE(CI)]
subject to:
BI(CI , CE(CI))xI [P I(CI , CE(CI))DI − 1] ≥ 0 NBC
The Incumbent has again three options: serve the Safe borrowers (inducing screening),
serve the Risky ones (also inducing screening), or target both types. We analyze one by one
these options.
Consider first the case in which the Incumbent prefers to serve both types of borrowers.
To maximize the borrower welfare the Incumbent sets DI as low as possible, so that the
NBC binds, and xI as high as possible. We have, therefore, DI = Db :=
1
βps+(1−β)pr and
xI = 1. The Entrant can only set an identical contract, or else she is out of the market.
Consider now the screening strategies. For each of the available options (serving the
Risky or the Safe borrowers), we have to show how the Incumbent behaves in order to
maximize the total borrower welfare. The results are summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. If the Incumbent behaves as a Smart Altruistic MFI and wants to induce screen-
ing, she optimally sets:
• DI = 1/ps if she wants to serve the Safe type only,
• DI = 1/pr if she wants to serve the Risky type only,
Proof. See 7
private firms compete in the same market. See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey.
11The behavior of a small, NGO-based program would probably be better described by a na¨ıve form of
altruism, in which the NGO only maximizes her clients’ utility subject to a non-bankruptcy constraint. The
equilibrium, in such case, is trivial.
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This result is intuitive but not trivial. It says that in both screening strategies, the best
the Incumbent can do is to set her repayment as low as possible, making her NBC binding.
The lemma is important for understanding how an altruistic attitude by the Incumbent can
influence the strategic behavior of the profit-maximizing Entrant. There are two components
to take into account: how the Incumbent’s altruism changes the Entrant’s outside options,
and the competitive effect of lower prices.
First, consider the case in which the Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers. In this setup
the Entrant cannot undercut the Incumbent’s contract, so the relevant outside option is
simply zero. Lemma 3 shows that the Incumbent’s altruism affects the Entrant’s profit only
insofar as it changes her outside options. The Entrant’s contract is otherwise independent
of the Incumbent’s one. Moreover, the Incumbent in this case faces a trade off: a lower D
implies a lower x to attain screening, so that a lower interest corresponds to more rationing.
This mechanism makes it less attractive for a Smart Altruistic Incumbent to specialize in the
Safe borrowers. To reduce the repayment, she has to ration more than a profit-maximizing
firm would do, without inducing a counterbalancing reaction of the Entrant.
Consider now the case in which the Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers. Given our
assumptions, the price 1/pr can be larger or smaller than Rs. If 1/pr < Rs, the Entrant
cannot undercut the Incumbent by setting DE = Rs as in Section 2.2. So, the Incumbent’s
altruism changes the outside option, and has a strong competitive effect on the Entrant’s
strategy. The impact is less important when 1/pr > Rs: in that case, the Entrant has the
same outside option as in Section 2.2 (i.e. to set DE = Rs), but x
E can now be larger and,
as a result, all the borrowers are better off compared to in the profit maximizing model.
Despite the observations above, under the current assumptions a Smart Altruistic Incum-
bent prefers not to play a screening strategy. The result is described in the next proposition:
Proposition 2. The model with a Smart Altruistic Incumbent has a unique Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium, in which both the Incumbent and the Entrant set CI = CE = (1, Db).
Proof. See Appendix
The result follows immediately through the comparison of the total borrower welfare in
the three possible situations. It is important to note, though, that the result depends on
the assumption that each MFI can serve serve the whole market. When this assumption is
relaxed, i.e. if we assume that MFI i faces a capacity constraint αi < 1, with i = I, E and
αE+αI ≤ 1, the result changes. To simplify the analysis, assume that αE < (1−αI)(1−β)12.
The capacity constraints have two effects: on the one hand, they limit the positive impact
of the Incumbent’s altruism (the Incumbent can serve a smaller number of clients) making
the other strategies comparatively more attractive; on the other, they change the Entrant’s
outside options, since she can always serve the residual demand charging monopolistic prices.
A Smart Altruistic Incumbent with capacity constraint opts for specialization under
simple conditions. Note that αE represents the residual demand the Entrant can serve if all
12The result holds also when this assumption is relaxed.
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borrowers prefer the contract offered by the Incumbent since, by assumption, αE ≤ (1−αI).
Let α¯I be the value of αI for which the Incumbent is indifferent between engaging in a
screening strategy and serving Both types. Finally, define:
ΠResR := α
E(1− β)(m− 1)
ΠResB := α
E[β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1)]
ΠResR and ΠResB represent the outside options of the Entrant, that is the profit she can make
by serving the residual demand. The equilibrium under our new assumptions is described
in the next proposition:
Proposition 3. Consider the model with a Smart Altruistic Incumbent and the capacity
constraints. Then there exists an α¯I such that:
• When αI ≥ α¯, in equilibrium the Incumbent sets CI = (1, Db) and the Entrant sets
CE = (1, Rs) if ΠResR < ΠResB and C
E = (1, Rr) otherwise.
• When αI ≤ α¯, there exist equilibria with screening provided that αI ≥ (1 − β) [αE ≥
(1− β)] where the Incumbent serves the Risky [Safe] borrowers.
Proof. See 7
Due to the large number of cases to be examined, the values of the threshold α¯I and the
full characterization of the screening contracts are reported in the Appendix.
In order to make screening possible, it is first of all essential that the market of Risky
borrowers be fully covered. Otherwise, the excluded borrowers would sign a contract designed
for the Safe ones. Secondly, αI should not be too large. The Altruistic Incumbent, in this
case, faces a trade-off. When engaging in a screening strategy, she can serve a smaller number
of clients (β or 1 − β). But in a screening strategy she can give a larger rent to her clients
since, if she targets both types, the Safe borrowers de facto subsidize the Risky ones.
When αI is relatively small, there are two effects. On the one hand, DI must (weakly)
increase as αI decreases, since the Entrant’s outside option of serving the residual demand
becomes more attractive. On the other, since the direct impact on her borrowers’ welfare
decreases (she can serve a smaller number of them), the Incumbent must rely more on the
competitive effect induced by lower prices. The best way to maximize the latter effect is to
induce the Entrant to engage in a screening strategy and avoid her behaving as a monopolist
on the residual demand.
It is interesting to observe that α¯ is decreasing in β. This implies that the riskier the
market, the larger the range of parameters for which equilibria with screening exist.
Note that when the altruistic Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers, in equilibrium
rationing is bounded to be extremely low (xEs = 1− ). In the profit-maximizing Incumbent
case, the amount of credit can be much lower since xˆs can take any value in the interval
[0, 1]. This is due to the fact that the binding incentive constraint is the one ensuring that
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the Risky borrowers do not prefer the contract designed for the Safe borrowes. Now, when
the Incumbent is altruistic, the Risky borrowers are already given the maximal possible rent,
and this mitigates the necessity to ration the Safe ones.
5. Discussion of the main results
The models presented above have a number of relevant implications in terms of policy.
In what follows, we briefly discuss three issues: (i) how a price cap would influence borrower
welfare; (ii) whether the presence of an altruistic MFI can discourage entry of competitors
and limit the outreach of microfinance; (iii) the use of the loan size as an indicator of the
outreach of microfinance programmes.
5.1. Price caps
Imposing a price cap can be a sensible policy if MFIs are believed to be able to extract
exploitative rent from the borrowers they serve. Our stylized model, shows that MFIs are
able to extract rent only when offering a menu of contracts is too costly. We believe this
assumption to be realistic for many microfinance institutions.
To understand the consequences that a price cap could bring to our setup, assume that
policy makers impose a cap D to the repayment, with D ∈ [Rs, Rr]. Suppose also that k is
large enough and that MFIs play a screening strategy in equilibrium. In such a situation, the
price cap can cause a reduction of the profit of the MFI serving the Risky borrowers. If this
happens, Risky borrowers can enjoy a larger rent and screening is possible for larger values
of xs. Thus, a price cap, would increase the profit of the MFI serving the Safe borrowers
who, in turn, would still get no rents, but would benefit from being less rationed.
Following this analysis, a price cap could also lead to a drastic change of equilibrium if
one of the conditions necessary for screening to take place, k > Πsi , is not satisfied after the
imposition of the price cap. In this case, both MFIs react to the regulation by offering the
same contract, and both make no profit.
Our model predicts a similar phenomenon in the case of an Altruistic Incumbent with
capacity constraints. Under these assumptions, a price cap would limit the ability of the
Entrant to behave as a monopolist on the residual demand, and reduce the incentives of the
Incumbent to induce a screening equilibrium.
In all these scenarios, there is a clear advantage for borrowers, but the price cap could
have dramatic effects on the profit of MFIs and could reduce the variety of products within
the market. This highlights how important it is, before implementing this type of policy, to
investigate the effects of a drop in profits on the outreach and on the incentives to invest in
microfinance.
5.2. The effect of altruism and capacity constraints on entry
The presence of an altruistic MFI has the obvious consequence of increasing borrower
welfare. However, some have pointed out that it could also hamper the development of a
competitive and open financial sector: a strongly socially motivated player could discourage
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possible investors from entering the market, due to overly-harsh price competition (Rhyne,
1998; Prahalad, 2004; Christen and Drake, 2002).
In contrast to this, our model shows that when capacity constraints limit the outreach,
the presence of an altruistic MFI can also have a positive impact on the profit-maximizing
Entrant. Consider a situation in which the Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers and the
Entrant serves the Safe ones. In the screening equilibria of the Altruistic Incumbent model
there are two contrasting effects. On the one hand, the Entrant, serving the Safe borrowers,
can reduce rationing to the minimum. This has a positive effect on her profits. On the other,
the Incumbent’s offer is so low that even the Safe borrowers must be offered a rent. This
clearly reduces the profit. For a large range of the parameters, the former effect outweighs
the latter, so that the Entrant is better off when the Incumbent is Altruistic. One example
is given in Figure 4.
βmax
β
ΠΕ 
Π.EAI
ΠEPM
Figure 2: Entrant Profit: Comparison of AI model and PM model
The figure shows the Entrant’s profit as a function of β. We considered an example in
which 1/pr > D
I
min. The dashed line Π
E
PM represents the Entrant’s profit in the Profit-
Maximizing Incumbent model, when a screening equilibrium prevails. The grey line labeled
as ΠEAI shows instead the Entrant’s profit in the Altruistic Incumbent model when she serves
the Safe borrowers and the Incumbent serves the Risky ones. Let βmax = α¯(β)
−1. Then for
β < βmax – that is in the interval in which the Altruistic Incumbent prefers to serve the Risky
borrowers – ΠEAI is bigger than Π
E
PM for β big enough. In other words, the negative effect
due to harsh price competitions can be outweighed by the positive effect of less rationing.
In order to get this effect, α must be relatively small and the pool of borrowers must
be heterogeneous enough (that is ps − pr must be large).13 The validity of these conditions
ought to be tested. But the result seems to be in line with the findings in McIntosh et al.
(2005).
13By equating ΠE in the two different models, we can solve for the value of β in which the two curves
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5.3. Credit Rationing vs Depth of Outreach
A growing number of papers study the evolution of microfinance outreach to the poor.
They investigate whether the hunt for profitability and the increase in competition are
leading to a mission drift, i.e. a shift towards relatively wealthier market niches. Most of
these papers use the loan size as a proxy for outreach (See Cull et al., 2009b, Cull et al.,
2007, Mersland and Øystein Strøm, 2010). The logic is that, in order for MFIs to serve
poorer clients, they must offer smaller loans. Empirical evidence suggest that this measure
is strongly related to other proxies for outreach to the poor, like the fraction of clients living
in rural areas or the fraction of women served. This supports the general validity of such a
measure.
Yet our model suggests that some caution is necessary when taking this approach. In an
oligopolistic market with asymmetric information, the size of the loan can also be used as
a tool to select borrowers. Even assuming that borrowers are all equal in terms of wealth,
competing MFIs can have incentives to reduce the size of the loan in order to screen borrowers
and extract more rent. Thus, any assessment of microfinance outreach based on a measure
such as the loan size can be capturing simultaneously two different effects. More research is
necessary in this respect.
6. Conclusions
Microfinance has attracted an important variety of actors, pursuing different objectives
and competing with each other in order to attract clients. Our stylized model describes
the interaction between these actors in a tractable framework, capturing some of the special
features of microcredit markets. We explain why MFIs need to standardize their offer at
the firm level, and how the cost they face can shape the market equilibrium and the interest
rate.
Our results are important for a series of reasons: First, we show that increasing compe-
tition does not necessarily lead to an improvement in borrower welfare. On the contrary,
competition can facilitate screening when MFIs are unable to offer a menu of contract. This
helps them to extract more rent. The conditions predicted by our model for screening to
take place are fairly general; nonetheless, we believe that an empirical test of their validity
would be an important contribution for practitioners and policy makers.
Second, we show how important it is to take into account the different motives of MFIs.
The interaction between competing MFIs leads to remarkably different equilibria when al-
truism is modeled explicitly.
intersect, say β∗. Then, by simple algebra, it can be shown that β∗ ∈ [0, α] if, and only if:
α ≤ pr(prRs − 1) + ps
pr(m+ prRs − 1)
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Third, when modeling altruism, our results depend crucially on whether MFIs are finan-
cially constrained or not. Despite large investments in the sector, a large share of MFIs still
consider the lack of resources as one of the main obstacles to their expansion. Our model
provides some indications as to how the market equilibrium can change as the investments
(or the subsidies) in the sector increase.
Lastly, our model provides a simplified framework to re-think a number of, extremely
relevant themes, such as the imposition of a price cap, the influence of altruism on entry and
the measurement of outreach.
Of course, an exhaustive analysis of the effects of competition ought to also consider
a series of closely-related issues (for instance multiple borrowing and information sharing
between lenders) and other important dimensions defining microfinance contracts (duration,
frequency of repayment, lending mechanism). Considering all these elements in a comprehen-
sive setting is difficult also due to a scarcity of adequate data. Our stylized model provides
a first approach in this direction, but more research is needed in order to understand the
way microfinance institutions compete with one another.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the Incumbent wishes to serve the Safe borrowers only, and that
she offers the contract described in Lemma 1. We show that the Entrant’s optimal reaction is to
offer a screening contract. We first compute the profits the Entrant achieves serving the Risky
borrowers only, that is when BE(CI , CE) = 1− β. Her maximization problem in this case is:
max
xE ,DE
ΠErs = (1− β)xE(prDE − 1)
In order to have BE(CI , CE) = 1− β, we need the following conditions to hold:
DE ≤ Rr PC1
DI ≤ Rs PC2
xEpr(Rr −DE) ≥ xIpr(Rr −DI) IC1
xIps(Rs −DI) ≥ xEps(Rs −DE) IC2
Consider first the constraints PC1 and IC1. The IC1 is always binding, since the left-hand side
is decreasing in DE . Solving it for DE we get: DE = Rr − xIxE (Rr − DI). What about xE?
Substituting DE in the profit function we get:
ΠErs = (1− β)xE [prRr − pr
xI
xE
(Rr −DI)− 1] = (1− β)(xEprRr − xE − prxI(Rr −DI))
that is clearly maximized for xE = 1 given that prRr = m > 1. So the Entrant can set: x
E = 1
and DE = Rr − xIxr (Rr −DI), that gives her the expected profit:
ΠErs = (1− β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr −DI)]
This profit must be compared with the Entrant’s outside options. She can target both types
of borrowers, undercutting the Incumbent’s contract. This can be done by setting xE = 1 and
DE = DI . The profit is then ΠBoth := β(psD
I − 1) + (1− β)(prDI − 1).
The Entrant serves the Risky borrowers when the following condition holds true:
(1− β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr −DI)] ≥ β(psDI − 1) + (1− β)(prDI − 1)
Solving the inequality for xI we find the condition:
xI ≤ xˆIs(DI) :=
(1− β)(m− 1)− β(psDI − 1) + (1− β)(prDI − 1)
(1− β)pr(Rr −DI) (.1)
Because of our assumptions, ΠBoth might be negative. In that case, the condition above becomes:
(1− β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr −DI)] ≥ 0
Solving the inequality for xI we find the alternative condition:
xI ≤ xˆIs(DI) :=
Rr(m− 1)
m(Rr −DI) (.2)
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Note that, in both cases, xˆIs(D
I) is not necessarily in [0, 1). If xˆIs(D
I) is greater than one, then
screening is possible for any xI < 1.
We still have to show that these values of xˆIs(D
I) make screening possible. We have to verify
that given the optimal reaction of the Entrant, the value xˆs satisfies also condition (IC2). Replacing
xE = 1 and DE = Rr − xIxE (Rr −DI) in the IC2 we get:
xI(Rs −DI) ≥ [Rs −Rr + xI(Rr −DI)]⇒ xI(Rs −Rr) ≥ Rs −Rr
that is satisfied for any xI ∈ [0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the Incumbent wants to specialize in the Risky sector, inducing the
Entrant to serve the Safe borrowers. The Entrant solves this maximization problem:
max
xE ,DE
ΠEsr = βx
E(psD
E − 1)
To have BE(CI , CE) = β, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
DE ≤ Rs PC1
DI ≤ Rr PC2
xIpr(Rr −DI) ≥ xEpr(Rr −DE) IC1
xEps(Rs −DE) ≥ xIps(Rs −DI) IC2
We have to consider two possible cases: (i) the Incumbent sets DI ≥ Rs; (ii) the Incumbent sets
DI < Rs. We show that as long as D
I ≥ Rs the Incumbent can raise ΠEsr by setting a lower
DI . But if DI < Rs the Entrant’s profit might decrease because a lower D
E (necessary to have
screening) is only partly compensated by a higher xE .
(i) DI ≥ Rs. This is the relevant case when the Incumbent is profit-maximizing. Consider first the
IC2. As DI ≥ Rs the RHS is negative, and the PC binds. Thus the Entrant can set DE = Rs.
Consider now the IC1. Solving it for xE we find the condition:
xE ≤ x
I(Rr −DI)
Rr −DE (.3)
that is binding at the optimum. Notice that if DI = Rr, (.3) is true only for x
E = 0. So the
Incumbent must offer a contract with DI < Rr. The Entrant’s expected profits are then:
ΠEsr = βxˆ
I
s(D
I)(m− 1) (.4)
This must be compared with the Entrant’s outside options. She can:
1. Target both types by offering a non incentive-compatible contract characterized by DE = Rs
and xE = 1. This strategy gives profit ΠBoth = β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1). In this case,
for the Incumbent to find it preferable to serve the Safe types, we need ΠEsr ≥ ΠBoth. In
formulas:
βxE(m− 1) ≥ β(m− 1) + (1− β)(prRs − 1) =⇒ xE ≥
(
1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1)
)
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It is clear that this condition is satisfied only if (1 − β)(prRs − 1) < 0, i.e. there must be
some cross-subsidization. Replacing xE with (.3) we get:
DI ≤ Rr − 1
xI
[
1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1)
]
(Rr −Rs)
2. Target the Risky sector, undercutting the Incumbent: As shown above, to induce screening
the Incumbent must set DI = Rr − xE/xI(Rr − Rs). We can determine the relevant value
of xE by solving the inequality :
βxE(m− 1) ≥ (1− β)[(m− 1)− prxE(Rr −Rs)] =⇒
xE ≥ (1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs) .
Now replacing again xE with (.3) we get:
DI ≤ Rr − 1
xI
[ (1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs)
]
(Rr −Rs)
Summing up, if we define
x˜s := max
{
1 +
(1− β)(prRs − 1)
β(m− 1) ,
(1− β)(m− 1)
β(m− 1) + (1− β)(m− prRs)
}
(.5)
then D˜Ir(x˜s) = Rr − 1xI x˜s(Rr −Rs) gives the upper bound for DI .
(ii) DI < Rs. This case is relevant when the Incumbent is altruistic. We can rewrite the incentive
constraints in this way:
xEps(Rs −DE) ≥ ps(Rs −DI) ⇒ DE ≤ Rs − x
I
xE
(Rs −DI)
pr(Rr −DI) ≥ xEpr(Rr −DE) ⇒ DE ≥ Rr − x
I
xE
(Rr −DI)
The equations above delimit an interval of contracts satisfying both incentive constraints. For
xE < 1 this interval for DE exists and has a strictly positive measure. So for any contract offered
by the Incumbent with DI < Rs the Entrant can make screening possible by choosing x
E < 1 and
DE < DI , making the Safe borrower’s incentive constraints binding. By doing this, she can earn
up to Πsr ∼= xEβ(psDI − 1). She chooses this strategy if, and only if, it gives her a higher profit
than the possible outside options: serving the residual demand or undercutting the Incumbent’s
contract. Let then DImin be the minimal value of D
I making the Entrant indifferent between the
screening profit and the outside option. That gives the lower bound for DI .
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) We know that when the Incumbent offers a contract like the one
described in Lemma 1, the Entrant reacts by offering a contract that makes screening possible.
Thus the Incumbent profits are given by ΠIs = βxˆs(Rs)(m− 1). Consider ΠIs as a function of β. It
is easy to show that ΠIs is positive and concave, first increasing and then decreasing, for β ∈ [0, β0],
where β0 =
m(Rr−Rs)
m(2Rr−Rs)−Rr) . It is equal to zero at the point β = β0.
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We need to compare ΠIs to Π
I
r . We know that, if the Incumbent wants to serve the risky
borrowers, the outside options of the Entrant (serving both types and undercutting the Incumbent
serving the Risky borrowers) are equal in the point:
βˆ =
√
(m− 1)2mR2r(Rr −Rs)(Rr −mRs) +m(Rr −Rs)(mRs −Rr)
(1 + (m− 3)m)R2r +m(1 +m)RrRs −m2R2s
Now, consider the interval β ∈ [0, βˆ] and suppose the Incumbent prefers serving the Risky
borrowers. Here the best outside option for the Entrant is to serve the Risky borrowers, under-
cutting the Incumbent. Note that, by Lemma 2, it must be that in this interval ΠIr = Π
E
s . In
fact a profit-maximizing incumbent always chooses the highest possible DI making the Entrant
indifferent between the screening strategy and the outside option. Now, by contradiction, suppose
that ΠIs < Π
I
r . By the equality before, that would imply that Π
I
s < Π
E
s . Simple algebra shows that
xˆIs(Rs) ≥ x˜Es (compare equations .1 and .2 to equation .5), i.e. that the level of rationing chosen
by the Incumbent when serving the Safe borrowers is smaller the the level of rationing that the
Entrant would choose when serving the Safe borrowers. Hence it must be that ΠIs ≥ ΠEs .
Consider now the interval β ∈ [βˆ, 1]. ΠIr is a piecewise function, and in the interval we are
considering it is strictly convex and decreasing in β. It crosses ΠIs twice in the points β = βˆ and
β = β0, where it becomes negative (see Figure 1). Given the properties of Π
I
s, it follows that
ΠIs > Π
I
r in the interval [βˆ, 1].
(ii) When β > β0, both Π
I
s and Π
I
r are negative. Therefore the Incumbent sets x
I = 1 and DI
as low as possible to avoid being undercut, namely DI = 1/pb. The Entrant can only replicate this
contract and both MFIs make zero profit.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose first that the smart altruistic Incumbent wants to serve only the
Safe sector, and that she wants to induce the Entrant to engage in a screening strategy. As shown
in Lemma 1 this is done by offering xI ≤ xˆIs(DI). We have to consider the effects of her choice on
the Safe borrowers she serves and on the Risky borrowers the Entrant serves.
We show, first of all, that when xI = xˆIs(D
I), the Entrant’s optimal contract does not depend on the
value of DI . We know that the Entrant’s reaction is to offer DE = Rr− xIxE (Rr−DI). Substituting
for the adequate value of xˆIs(D
I), it is very easy to check that the value DE is independent of DI .
So, what matters is the utility enjoyed by the Safe borrowers. Note that, in all the cases analyzed
in Lemma 1, xˆs(·) is increasing in DI . So, for an altruistic MFI, there is a tradeoff between
offering the borrowers a cheaper contract and rationing them more. To find the optimal solution,
we need to substitute for xˆs in the objective function, that in this case reduces to βx
Ips(Rs−DI).
In the relevant interval, this equation is decreasing and concave in DI . The NBC reduces to
βxI(psD
I − 1) ≥ 0. The MFI chooses the lowest possible value of DI , that is the value that makes
her profit equal to zero. This is given by DI = 1/ps.
Suppose now that the Incumbent chooses to serve the Risky sector. To maximize the Risky
borrower’s utility, the Incumbent wants to set xI as high as possible, namely equal to one, and
DI as low as possible. The value of DI that makes the NBC binding is 1/pr. Note that 1/pr
can be smaller or bigger than Rs. As described in Lemma 2, the Incumbent can induce screening
by setting xI = 1 and DI = 1/pr. This endows the borrowers served by the Incumbent with the
highest possible rent. At the same time, it has a positive influence on the borrowers served by the
Entrant, since tougher price competition forces her to reduce the repayment DE and increase the
value of xE .
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Proof of Proposition 2. When the Incumbent serves both types of borrowers, she sets D =
Db :=
1
βps+(1−β)pr . The total borrower welfare is then:
Wb := βps (Rs −Db) + (1− β)pr (Rr −Db) = m− 1
Note that since prDb might be smaller than one, this strategy can entail cross-subsidization.
Suppose now that the Incumbent serves the Safe borrowers. Then, as showed in Lemma 3, the
Incumbent sets Ds=1/ps, and the Entrant outside option is simply zero. It follows that xˆIs must
be such that:
(1− β) ((m− 1)− prxˆIs(Rr − 1/ps)) > 0 ⇒ xˆIs = (m− 1)RrmRr −Rs
The total borrower welfare is then:
Ws := βxˆ
I
s(m− 1) + (1− β)pr
(
Rr − (Rr − xˆIs(Rr − 1/ps))
)
= m− 1− (m− 1)(Rr −Rs)β
mRr −Rs
Since the last addendum is always positive, it follows that Wb > Ws.
Suppose now that the Incumbent serves the Risky borrowers. Two cases must be considered.
(i) If 1/pr < Rs, the Entrant cannot set Ds at his highest, or else the Safe borrowers would also
take the Incumbent’s contract. In order to make screening possible, the following constraints needs
to be satisfied:
xEs ps(Rs −DEs ) ≥ xIrps(Rs −DIr )⇒ xEs (Rs −DEs ) ≥ (Rs − 1/pr)
xIrpr(Rr −DIr ) ≥ xEs pr(Rr −DEs )⇒ (Rr − 1/pr) ≥ xEs (Rr −DEs )
By setting xs = 1−  and Ds = 1/pr − , the constraints are simultaneously satisfied and screening
is possible. Thus, the total borrower welfare is given by:
Wr := βps(Rs − 1/pr) + (1− β)pr(Rr − 1/pr) = m− 1− β(Rr/Rs − 1)
It follows that Wb > Wr.
(ii) If 1/pr > Rs, than the Entrant can set Ds = Rs, so that all Safe borrowers enjoy no rent. It
follows that the total borrower welfare is given by:
Wr := (1− β)pr(Rr − 1/pr) = (1− β)(m− 1)
Also in this case, Wb > Wr.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose first that the Incumbent wants to serve both types of borrowers
setting D = Db :=
1
βps+(1−β)pr . Then, the Entrant’s best response is to target the residual demand.
The total borrower welfare is:
Wb :=
{
αI (βps (Rs −Db) + (1− β)pr (Rr −Db)) = αI(m− 1) if ΠResR > ΠResB
αI(m− 1) + α(1− β)pr(Rr −Rs) if ΠResB > ΠResR
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Wb is an increasing, linear function of α
I .
Consider now the case in which the Incumbent wants to serve the Safe types only. She can set
Ds = 1/ps, and the Entrant’s outside option is to serve the residual demand. Following the same
procedure explained in Lemma 1, to induce screening the Incumbent must set xI such that the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1− β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr − 1/ps)] ≥ ΠResR if ΠResR > ΠResB
(1− β)[(m− 1)− prxI(Rr − 1/ps)] ≥ ΠResB if ΠResB > ΠResR
Let xˆs be the value of x
I such that the the relevant condition above is satisfied with strict equality.
Note that xˆs is a function of α
E . Then the total borrower welfare is given by:
Ws := βxˆs(m− 1) + (1− β)pr(Rr − (Rr − xˆs(Rr − 1/ps))
Note that this function does not depend on αI and is always positive.
Suppose now that the Incumbent prefers to target the Risky borrowers only. The Incumbent
would like to set DI as low as possible, namely DI = 1/pr and xI = 1. But 1/pr might be
smaller than Rs, and therefore the Incumbent contract could be affordable also to Safe borrowers.
Moreover, if DI < Rs and the Entrant wants to target the Risky borrowers, the Entrant’s profit
decreases as DI decrease. Let Dmin < Rs be the value of D
I such that the Entrant is indifferent
between serving the Safe borrowers only and the relevant outside option. We need to distinguish
three cases.
Case 1: 1/pr > Rs. The Entrant’s best outside option is to set D
E = Rs and undercut
the Incumbent. Following the same procedure explained in Lemma 2, to induce screening the
Incumbent must set DI such that the following conditions are satisfied:
βxs(D
I)(psRs − 1) ≥ ΠResB
Let xˆs(1/pr) be the value of x
I such that the the condition above is satisfied with strict equality.
Note, again, that xˆs is a function of α
E .The total borrower welfare is:
Wr := βxˆs(Rs−Rs) + (1− β)pr(Rr − 1/pr) = (1− β)(m− 1)
that is always positive and independent of αI .
Case 2: 1/pr < Dmin ≤ Rs. The Entrant’s outside option is serving the residual demand.
Following the same procedure explained in Lemma 2, to induce screening the Incumbent must set
DI as low as possible, namely DI = Dmin, so that the following conditions are satisfied with strict
inequality:
βxs(D
I)(psRs − 1) ≥ ΠResR if ΠResR > ΠResB
βxs(D
I)(psRs − 1) ≥ ΠResB if ΠResB > ΠResR
as explained in Proposition 2, xE can be set arbitrarily close to 1, so that xˆs = 1− , with  ∈ R+.
The total borrower welfare is:
Wr := βxˆs(Rs− (Dmin − )) + (1− β)pr(Rr −Dmin)
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that is always positive and independent of αI .
Case 3: Dmin ≤ 1/pr ≤ Rs. In this case, the Incumbent can set DI = 1/pr and xI = 1. The
Entrant reacts by setting DE = 1/pr −  and xE = 1 − , making screening possible. The total
borrower welfare is:
Wr := β(Rs − 1/pr) + (1− β)(Rr − 1/pr) = (m− 1)− β
(
ps
pr
− 1
)
that is always positive and independent of αI .
We can now compare Wb, Ws, and Wr. First of all, note that screening is possible only if the
capacity of the MFI serving the Risky borrower is large enough to serve them all. This is because
Risky borrowers can always afford the contract designed for the Safe ones and they always prefer
it to being excluded from credit. Second, note that Wb is linear and increasing in α
I , whereas Ws
and Wr are independent of α
I but decreasing in αE . It follows that, when all Risky borrowers can
be served, there exists an αˆ such that for any αI ≤ αˆ, max{Ws,Wr} ≥Wb.
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